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Policy Choices about Agricultural Externalities and Sustainability: 
Diverse Approaches, Options and Issues 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews agricultural externalities as a source of market failure and as a 
reason for a lack of sustainability of agricultural incomes and production. It 
concentrates mainly on environmental externalities (which include biodiversity 
loss) but consideration is also given to externalities involving adverse selection. 
Types of agricultural externalities are classified and their nature is explored. 
Depending on their type and nature, different policy implications often follow. For 
example, no intervention may be required, or it may be reasonable for a farmer to 
have to pay to create an unfavourable externality or be paid to moderate or 
eliminate it. Adverse selection is also an externality phenomenon and some of its 
implications for agricultural policy are explored. Traditionally, environmental 
economics has focused on economic efficiency in formulating policies for 
environmental regulation but equity is also important in relation to public policy. 
The implications of various equity priciples for designing policies to address the 
occurrence of agricultural externalities are outlined. Attention is subsequently 
centred on the economic practicality of agricultural environmental policies when 
account is taken of transaction costs and knowledge limitations, as well as the 
political and social acceptability of such policies. These factors can alter the choice 
of ideal policies. Biodiversity change (conservation and loss) involving agriculture 
is considered as a particular case. By showing the relevance for agricultural policy 
of diverse foci, this study accords with the polycentric approach of Konrad 
Hagedorn. His approach should make us wary of cut-and-dried specific but narrow 
policy solutions that characterise traditional environmental economics. The 
"exactitude" of these solutions appears in many cases to be obtained at the expense 
of relevance. 
 
 
Policy Choices about Agricultural Externalities and Sustainability: 
Diverse Approaches, Options and Issues 
 
1. Introduction 
As originally pointed out by Arthur Pigou (1932) and as is now well known, 
economic externalities (whether favourable or unfavourable) can be an important 
source of market failure. However, the mere presence of externalities does not mean 
that they are Pareto relevant. When unfavourable externalities are infra-marginal, 
they are often irrelevant. However, if alternative production techniques or 
consumption methods are available with different sets of externalities, market 
failure can still occur (Tisdell, 1993, Chs. 2 and 3). Even if no significant 
externalities are observed from an economic activity, for example when a particular 
type of farming is adopted, an alternative type of activity or set of farming practices 
may generate large positive externalities and be socially superior. In such a case, 
market failure also occurs even though no actual externality is observed. This 
implies that in order to assess whether externalities could be Pareto relevant, one 
has to consider not only the marginal external effects of economic activities but also 
their total effects (Tisdell, 2005 Ch.3). Evaluation of externalities is much more 
complex than has been traditionally realized and cannot be done accurately by 
adopting only a marginalist point of view. 
 
Note that failure to take adequate account of externalities is not peculiar to market 
systems but also occurs in non-market systems, including state decision-making 
about resource-use. Failure to take proper account of externalities in state decision-
making might also be more widespread in societies where democracy and freedom 
of speech and communication are limited, such as appeared to be the case in many 
centralized communist countries. There is considerable evidence that inadequate 
attention was given to the effects of adverse environmental externalities in former 
communist countries. One of the many examples includes the decision by the Soviet 
Union to extensively use waters feeding the Aral Sea for irrigating cotton with 
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subsequent serious adverse effects on the Aral Sea itself. Not only does state 
decision-making often fail to take sufficient account of environmental spillovers, 
but also inadequate attention is sometimes given to sustainability issues. A recent 
example is Indonesia’s transmigration programme from Java to Kalimantan. The 
Indonesian government has sponsored resettlement projects intended to grow rice 
on peat lands in Kalimantan Their soil quality is such that agricultural production is 
not sustainable on these lands. In addition, these land areas are often the source of 
fires that cause air pollution in Southeast Asia and add to greenhouse gas emissions 
(Singleton et al., 2004, p.70).  
 
However, as pointed out by Galbraith (1952, 1967), the presence of democracy and 
freedom of speech do not ensure that governments take adequate account of 
externalities in their decision-making. Political lobbying and associated 
mechanisms can result in economic failure of a Paretian type. 
 
In this article, the patterns and nature of agricultural externalities and their 
relationship to agricultural sustainability are discussed first. The nature of such 
externalities has normative implications for the choice of public policies to regulate 
those spillovers and these implications are outlined. While the main emphasis in 
this article is on environmental externalities from and within agriculture, attention is 
also given to agricultural externalities arising from adverse selection. This aspect, 
together with the regulation of agriculture’s environmental externalities, is being 
addressed under the EU’s new Common Agricultural Policy. The implications are 
explored for agricultural environmental policy of features often associated with the 
New Institutional Economics, such as transaction costs and aspects of uncertainty in 
policy formation and implementation are considered. Subsequently attention is 
given to political and social acceptability as influences on choices about agricultural 
policy. Then agriculture’s role in biodiversity conservation is considered as a 
particular case. In line with the polycentric approach of Konrad Hagedorn, topics in 
this analysis are considered from multiple points of view. 
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2. Types of Agricultural Externalities and their Relationship to Agricultural 
Sustainability: Classifying Agricultural Externalities. 
Externalities involving agriculture can be classified in varied ways. The public’s 
attitude about how externalities involving agriculture should be regulated are likely 
to be influenced by their nature, as is discussed below. The following types of 
spillovers involving agriculture can be identified: 
(1) Spillovers from non-agricultural sectors of the economy affecting 
agriculture. Agriculture can experience adverse environmental externalities 
from airborne pollution caused by emissions of particulate matter, metallic 
dust, acidic vapour and particles as well as water pollution from wastes from 
factories and mining. For instance, horse breeders from the Scone area in the 
Hunter Valley of New South Wales, Australia, complain that coal dust from 
open-cut coal mines causes their naturally alkaline soils to turn acidic. It is 
claimed that this has adverse consequences for the development of the bones 
of the thoroughbred horses and makes them less fit for racing. 
(2) Spillovers from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors of the economy. 
Agriculture may, for example, create and sustain landscapes favoured by the 
public, such as heathlands, or in some cases, ones that are disliked by the 
public, such as weedy areas, for example areas of gorse in New Zealand. 
Similarly, while some types of agriculture conserve wild species wanted by 
the public, they also result in the loss of other species desired by the public. 
Water run-off from agricultural land containing chemicals leached from 
fertilizers and livestock manure as well as soil particles results in nutrient 
enrichment of water bodies and this stimulates growth of aquatic algae and 
weeds and accelerates eutrophication of some water masses. Run-off from 
agricultural lands (particularly land for growing sugar cane in northern 
coastal Queensland) is claimed to have an adverse impact on corals in parts of 
the Great Barrier Reef. Corals do not survive in dirty, nutrient-rich water.  
(3) Spillovers confined to agriculture itself. Unfavourable ones include dryland 
salting (if the effect extends beyond a farm where land clearing occurs), 
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salination of watercourses as a result of land clearing, herbicide or pesticide 
drift, adverse externalities from water use and possible cross-fertilization of 
GM (genetically modified) and non-GM crops. Favourable externalities 
within agriculture can result from pest control by farmers having pests on 
their property. 
To what extent should agriculture have to bear the economic burden of having to 
take action to moderate or add to its spillovers? Let us consider this matter. 
 
Marginal and total impacts of externalities 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the marginal effects of externalities and their total 
effects can be quite complex. These complexities are not adequately accounted for 
by traditional marginal economic analysis. Some of these complexities can be 
illustrated by a case in which agricultural production creates landscapes favoured by 
the public. These provide the basis for some subsidization of agricultural activities 
in the European Union (Van Huylenbroeck and Durand, 2003; Vanslembrouck and 
Van Huylenbroeck, 2005). 
 
For simplicity, assume that two methods of producing an agricultural product are 
available. Method I has no external costs or benefits and involves the least private 
cost of production. Represent the market demand for this agricultural product by 
line DD in Figure 1 and let S1S1 represent its market supply curve when technique I 
is adopted. Using this method of production, the market could come into 
equilibrium at E1. Suppose that a second method is available but involves higher 
costs of production. Consequently the supply curve S2S2 applies in this. This 
alternative method generates a favourable externality, for instance by creating 
favourable landscapes and marginal external value obtained is assumed to be equal 
to the difference between curve ABCF and line DD. Production using method II 
generates no marginal externality once its level exceeds X4. 
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Figure 1: An agricultural externality which favours from an economic welfare 
point of view a different method of production to that which would 
be adopted under free market conditions. 
  
Taking into account the favourable externality, economic welfare benefits from 
agriculture production are maximized when only method II is used and X3 of the 
agricultural product is supplied. This could be achieved by only allowing the use of 
method II and paying a subsidy of CE3 on each unit of product X supplied. 
However, the externality could be infra-marginal in some cases. 
 
Such a case is illustrated in Figure 2. As in the previous case, demand for greater 
quantities of the favoured landscape eventually falls to zero but in this case, 
satiation with the supply of the landscape occurs before market equilibrium is 
reached. Satiation with the landscape incidentally supplied as a result of agricultural 
activity occurs when X1 of product X is produced using technique II. Otherwise the 
same assumptions as in the previous case are made. In the absence of intervention, 
X3 of product X will be supplied using only technique I. However, because of 
landscape externalities, it is socially optimal that X0 of the product be supplied 
A S2
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O X1 X2 X3 X4
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using technique II with X3 − X0 being supplied by technique I. At X0, the marginal 
value of the externality, BG, is just equal to the difference in the marginal cost of 
production using the alternative technique. 
A 
S2B 
 
Figure 2: The infra-marginal externality in this case implies that only a part of 
agricultural production should be obtained by using the technique 
with the favourable externality.  
 
In this case, economic optimality can be achieved by paying a minimum subsidy on 
each unit of X produced equal to the excess marginal cost of its production using 
technique II rather than I up to an aggregate level of production of X0. No subsidy is 
paid for production exceeding X0. The per unit subsidy is lower in this case than in 
the previous case. 
 
The optimality condition given the situation in Figure 2 can be clarified by 
reference to Figure 3. There curve KLM represents the marginal value of the 
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externality when technique II is used. This falls to zero for a level of production of 
X1 or more. OH represents the marginal opportunity cost of using technique II 
rather than I to produce X. It is the difference between S2S2 and S1S1 in Figure 2, 
the difference in the per unit production cost between the techniques. The optimal 
outcome corresponds to point L. At this point, the marginal external value obtained 
by using technique II just equals the marginal opportunity cost of using it. 
 
 
Figure 3: Socially optimal extent of use of technique II in a situation 
corresponding to that illustrated in Figure 2. 
In the situation illustrated in Figure 2, a regulating authority requires more 
information than in the case shown in Figure 1 to regulate externalities so as to 
achieve a Paretian optimum. In most cases of this type, a regulatory authority is 
unlikely to have sufficient information to regulate economic activity optimally. 
However, it may be able to obtain an idea of when beneficiaries are likely to be 
satiated by a particular favourable environmental feature. It will never be optimal to 
proceed beyond the satiation point and if opportunity costs are involved, it will 
usually be socially optimal to supply less of the environmental amenity than results 
in satiation with it. 
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Adverse selection as an unfavourable externality 
Adverse selection involves asymmetric information about a product and occurs 
when buyers are unable to easily ascertain the quality of a product by inspection, 
even though it is known to suppliers. The problem then arises when products of 
inferior quality cost less to produce than those of superior quality, that the inferior 
ones my be traded as being of top or acceptable quality. This can cause the whole 
market for the products to collapse or result in only the inferior products being 
traded. (Akerloff, 1970; Varian, 1987, pp. 630-635). This happens even though 
buyers have an effective demand for the superior products.  
 
The conditions under which agricultural products are produced are often difficult to 
determine by inspecting the final product. It is often not clear from inspection 
whether food products are produced under hygienic conditions, are organic produce 
or not, or are derived from free-range animals or not. Furthermore, it is usually not 
clear from inspection whether agriculturally based products are derived from GMOs 
or not, whether their production involved a lack of consideration of animal welfare, 
whether production techniques were used that pose a potential health risk to humans, 
(for example, mad cow disease), or whether they actually come from regions or 
areas from where they are claimed to come. 
 
Governments can help to overcome some of these problems by requiring correct 
labelling of such products and imposing penalties for non-compliance and by 
ensuring that minimum hygiene conditions are complied with. Standards may also 
be attested to by trusted organizations. 
 
Adverse selection can result in lack of sustainability of agricultural production of 
superior products, can reduce regional production of specialities and in some cases 
could lead to the complete collapse of individual agricultural markets. Elimination 
of adverse selection benefits both buyers as well as sellers of superior or sought 
after products. 
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Environmental externalities and sustainability 
Lack of sustainability of agricultural production and of incomes often, but not 
always, arises form adverse environmental externalities affecting agriculture. 
Examples include depletion of shared water bodies such as aquifers, as a result of 
open-access or poorly regulated access to the water, spillovers from salting such as 
reduced water quality, or environmental pollution caused by other industries that 
adversely impact on agricultural production. It is also possible that loss of genetic 
diversity could eventually have adverse consequences for agricultural production. 
 
However, lack of sustainability of the productivity of agriculture cannot always be 
attributed to environmental externalities. Taking into account the discount rates 
which landholders apply, it may pay them to mine their land. The higher their 
discount rate, the more likely landholders are to do this. A higher discount rate 
results in stronger preferences for farm income now rather than in the future. Rising 
relative returns from investing off-farm rather than on-farm and easier access to off-
farm investment opportunities can also have a similar effect. In both cases lack of 
agricultural sustainability is a consequence of private decisions by farmers rather 
than a consequence of externalities. 
 
3. Equity, Efficiency and Agricultural Externalities 
The presence of externalities is often believed to provide a case for public 
intervention in an economy in order to bring about a Paretian improvement, 
particularly if the transaction costs involved in intervention are low or zero. 
Nevertheless, externalities can be Paretian irrelevant and infra-marginal in which 
case there are no economic efficiency grounds for intervention. 
Whether there are equity grounds for public intervention in this case is less clear. If 
infra-marginal externality is favourable should those who benefit from it have to 
pay those who generate it? The case for this seems to be weak because those who 
engage in the activity already gain from it and it is coincidental that the external 
beneficiaries also gain. Compared to its absence, there is a Paretian improvement as 
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a result of the activity. But what if an adverse externality is involved? Those 
creating the adverse externality gain but those that suffer from it lose compared to 
the original situation. Even though the adverse externality is Paretian irrelevant, 
there could be a case in such circumstances to compensate the victims on 
distributional grounds. 
The above indicates that the case for transferring income to agriculturalists on the 
basis that they create favourable externalities is sometimes weak on economic 
grounds. The externalities may be infra-marginal and Paretian irrelevant. However, 
compensation to farmers seems justifiable when it is intended that they should alter 
their activities at a cost to them in order to change the nature or extent of the 
favourable externalities they generate so as to bring added external benefits to 
others. The minimum necessary compensation in such cases would be the extra cost 
the agriculturalists incur. To the extent that farm income supports under the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) focus on this aspect, they could be regarded as 
being equitable and as promoting economic efficiency. In practice, however, it is 
debatable whether environmental policies can be so finely tuned. It may be that 
some agricultural subsidies are being paid for the generation of Paretian irrelevant 
externalities or that a greater amount is being paid than the costs of generating 
additions to favourable externalities.  
The presence of infra-marginal and extra-marginal externalities complicates the 
formulation of environmental policies. A neat simple solution to the presence of 
externalities of the type suggested by the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) hardly 
seems to be attainable. A serious shortcoming of this theorem is that it ignores 
equity issues and only concentrates on economic efficiency. The theorem asserts 
that in the absence of transaction costs, a Paretian optimum can be achieved if either 
polluters have the right to pollute or if others have the right to a pollution-free 
environment. However, the distribution of income is entirely different depending on 
whether those generating the adverse externality are given the right or those 
affected by it. A choice between the alternatives must be made on the grounds of 
10 
justice. It is less well known that Coase’s efficient solution to the externality 
problem is sensitive to the distribution of rights. 
Research by behavioural economists finds that the willingness of individuals to pay 
for an environmental good is generally less than their willingness to accept 
compensation for its loss. This has been described as the endowment or status quo 
effect (Kahneman et al., 1991, Knetsch, 1987, 1990). This effect results in a 
different bargained outcome given Coases’s approach depending upon whether 
those creating an adverse externality have the right to create it or whether those 
adversely affected by it have the right to disallow it. Hence, the efficient economic 
solution is sensitive to the distribution of rights. This can be illustrated by a simple 
example. 
Suppose an area of land is in a relatively natural state that is privately owned and 
suitable for agriculture. The owners are basically agriculturalists and would like to 
transform the land so its agricultural productivity can be raised. They need to clear 
the land of trees (of forest) but this creates adverse externality for others whom we 
shall call conservationists. 
If agriculturalists do not have the right to clear the land of trees, their marginal 
willingness to pay conservationists to allow this might be as indicated by line ABC 
in Figure 4. On the other hand, if agriculturalists have the right to land clearing, 
their marginal willingness to accept compensation to forgo land clearing might be 
as indicated by line DEF. Similarly, the marginal willingness to pay curve (to avoid 
deforestation) for conservationists might be as indicated by line GEH and their 
marginal willingness to permit deforestation might be as shown by line JBK. It 
follows if landowners (agriculturalists) have the right to clear their land, that E is 
the Coasian bargained solution. If on the other hand, conservationists have the right 
to tree-cover of the land, B is the Coasian bargained solution. In the former case, a 
larger percentage of the land is cleared, x2, than in the latter case which involves x1 
of the land being cleared. The efficient economic result is therefore sensitive to the 
distribution of rights. 
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 Figure 4: The Coasian solution is sensitive to the distribution of 
environmental rights. 
The reasons why the endowment or status quo effect exists and can be quite large 
has not yet been fully explained in the available economic literature. It may, 
however, be reinforced by the income effect. 
In reality, the presence of transaction costs can be expected to hinder or block the 
realization of an efficient Coasian bargained outcome to the control of 
environmental externalities. In some cases, transaction costs will be least if the 
government intervenes to address the externality problem directly. Direct 
government intervention to regulate environmental externalities is sometimes the 
most economical policy option. 
4. Transaction Costs Involved in Public Regulation of Externalities 
While public regulation of externalities can bring Paretian gains, this is by no means 
assured. Agency costs (transaction costs) are involved in the public regulation of 
externalities. This can be so high as to prevent a Paretian gain which would 
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otherwise occur. Information deficiencies on the part of regulators are also a 
problem and improved knowledge can only be obtained at a cost which in some 
cases, can prove to be excessive. 
Furthermore, principal-agent problems can arise if public servants look mainly 
towards their own self interest. They may try to maximize their income and that of 
their agency from their regulatory activities. They may fail to regulate 
environmental spillovers in a least cost manner and could absorb all the revenue 
obtained from environmental charges (or more if funded from general public 
revenue) in their administrative expenditure. 
The problem can be illustrated by the Figure 5. For simplicity, suppose the point 
emission of a water pollutant that adversely affects agriculturalists and other water 
users. Suppose that the marginal externality costs imposed by the emission of the 
pollutant are as indicated by line OBD in Figure 5 and that line ABC represents the 
marginal benefit to polluters of being able to pollute. In the absence of regulation, 
polluters will emit x2 of the water-borne pollutant per cent of time. This results in a 
social economic deadweight loss equivalent to the area of triangle BCD. A potential 
Paretian improvement is possible by reducing the level of these emissions from x2 
to x1. 
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 Figure 5: Illustration that the cost of public regulation of externalities can 
annul the social economic benefits from such regulation. 
This could be achieved by the government imposing a charge of OF on each unit of 
the pollutant emitted. This would yield the equivalent of the area OFBG in public 
revenue.  However, if public servants spend this much to administer the scheme, 
there will be a net social economic loss. Such a loss will occur if the cost of 
administering the scheme exceeds the area of triangle BCD. Furthermore, the equity 
question would remain of whether the victims of the water pollution should be fully 
compensated for their losses. In this case, even if emissions are reduced to x2, 
victims of the pollution still suffer an economic loss equivalent to the area of 
triangle OBG and so the reduction in emissions from x2 to x1 does not fully satisfy 
them. 
5. The Political Acceptability of Economic Policies  
Economic policies cannot, usually be implemented unless they are politically 
acceptable. This means that the policies likely to yield to greatest economic benefits 
cannot always be implemented. What factors influence the political acceptability of 
policies? 
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Social values and ethics play a role. These change or evolve with the passage of 
time and are subject to influence by propaganda and other means. Secondly, 
institutional constraints may also impact on what is politically acceptable. Given 
these constraints, constituents will be limited in the ways in which they can object 
to political decisions and the costs that they must incur to try to change these 
decisions will also be affected. Such costs can result in passive acceptance of 
political decisions that may be unpopular. Therefore, those policies that are 
politically acceptable will vary with the historical background and institutional 
structures of nations. 
While economists are often only concerned about the ultimate economic 
consequences of policies, political approaches tend to put much more emphasis on 
the procedures used for social decision-making. Some of these politically 
acceptable procedures can actually add to economic costs but constituents seem to 
be prepared to on occasions accept these in return for greater political or social 
involvement. 
The type of conflict that can arise between preferences for political procedures and 
social economic benefits can be illustrated by Figure 6. There on the X-axis a set of 
political procedures are in theory valued from the least acceptable which are closest 
to its origin to the more acceptable which are further from the origin. For simplicity, 
these procedures are assumed to be continuous but need not be. The Y-axis 
indicates the social economic benefits from these alternative political procedure 
only one of which may be chosen. These social economic benefits may for example 
be for alternative possible policies relating to the regulation of environmental 
externalities in agriculture. Curve ABC represents the frontier of possibilities, and 
W1W1 and W2W2 are social indifference curves of the Bergson type. 
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y W2 W1 
 
Figure 6: Diagram illustrating conflict between political acceptability of 
alternative political procedures and their social economic benefit. 
Given the possibilities illustrated in Figure 6, the combination corresponding to 
point B is socially ideal. However, it does not result in the best ‘attainable’ 
economic outcome nor does it correspond to the most desired political procedure. 
Note that the ideal solution is Figure 6 corresponding to point B can change if the 
social indifference curves vary or if the ordering of possible political procedures a 
alters, other things being constant. 
Although the presentation in Figure 6 is more illustrative than definitive, it helps to 
support the view expressed by Hagedorn (1993) that agricultural economists should 
take account of the political acceptability of economic policies when they propose 
these. At the same time, it can be important (from a social point of view) for 
economists to point out economic benefits forgone by adopting politically 
acceptable procedures and policies that yield inferior economic results. 
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6. Property Rights in Agricultural Genetic Material and Externalities 
It is often difficult to retain property rights in agricultural genetic material, and in 
the past, genetic material was frequently taken from those originally possessing it 
without any payment being made for its use. This is still possible today but this 
possibility has now become more limited due to laws granting intellectual property 
rights to those who develop new plant varieties and patents or similar protection for 
those who create new genetically modified organisms. The introduction of new 
organisms usually results in incompletely or unknown environmental risks. The 
more demanding is the screening required to determine these risks, the less 
profitable is it likely to be for enterprises to engage in such development. 
Furthermore, the greater are the environmental restrictions on the use of new 
organisms by the customers of their developers, the lower is the demand for these 
and the less incentive there is to develop them. For example, the more restrictions 
there are on the use of GM soya beans resistant to the herbicide glyphosate, the 
lower is the profitability of this innovation for Monsanto. Thus to some extent, a 
company such as Monsanto, will profit from fewer environmental restrictions on the 
use of its GM seed. On the other hand, very loose regulations could result in serious 
environmental problems and in turn, this could generate a political backlash for 
developers of GM seed. The appropriate level of environmental risk to take with 
new GMOs is uncertain. 
Nevertheless, public regulations ostensibly intended to protect the public against 
environmental risk often protect the party or parties that are the source of this risk. 
This is sometimes true of regulations that prescribe particular tests be carried out by 
those proposing to market a product for say use in agriculture. Provided the tests are 
conducted and show no problem, the seller may be free of further legal liability if a 
subsequent environmental problem emerges. The legal liability of the seller may be 
even curtailed further if a public body exists which authorises the use of the product 
(Tisdell,1993, Ch.5). 
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While intellectual property rights in new plant varieties and genetically modified 
organism could be justified on the basis that they provide economic incentives and 
rewards for research and innovation, the argument for property rights in existing 
natural genetic material appears to be more tenuous. Such rights might only be 
defensible on income distributional grounds or if the payment would result in 
conservation of the genetic material which otherwise would not occur. If the 
conservation of the material would have occurred in any case, payment for it would 
not be compensation for supplying a service. Apart from the huge transaction costs 
that would be involved in paying others for the use of all natural genetic agricultural 
material this might have little effect on the conservation of natural genetic material 
utilized in agriculture. Therefore, it is surprising that the Convention on Biological 
Diversity puts so much store on property rights in genetic material as a way of 
conserving biodiversity; a result that is widely believed to be environmentally 
desirable and to be favourable to sustaining economic development. 
7. Concluding Comments 
Externalities (of an environmental type and otherwise, such as those associated with 
adverse selection) are an important consideration in agro-environmental policy. 
They may result in lack of sustainability of agricultural production but are not the 
only factors that may do this. When agricultural externalities are infra-marginal or 
extra-marginal (and could be Paretian relevant, but not necessarily so) this increases 
the complexity of decision-making (compared to the neoclassical case in which 
only marginal externalities are taken into account) about whether government 
intervention can result in a Paretian improvement. For example, a greater amount of 
information is usually needed to analyze such cases and the question of whether 
public payments should be made to agriculturalists who generate favourable 
externalities and the appropriate pattern of transfers becomes complex. In some 
cases, there will be no economic efficiency grounds (in Pareto’s sense) for such 
transfers, and if they are made, the justification would have to be on distributional 
grounds. Politically, of course, it may be propitious to claim efficiency reasons as 
the basis for these income transfers. It is possible that some subsidies paid to 
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agriculturalists under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy on the basis that 
farmers are creating favourable externalities are not entirely based on efficiency 
tests, that is that farmers are creating a mixed product which reduces economic 
scarcity and which would otherwise not be supplied or not be supplied to an optimal 
extent in the absence of the subsidy (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008, Ch.4). 
Large public bureaucracies in modern nations and in bodies such as the EU may 
pose a particular problem when it comes to the regulation of externalities. First, 
they may be eager to increase their size and influence and they have some backing 
from economic theory that their intervention can promote economic efficiency. 
However, the qualifications made in economic analysis about whether public 
intervention will be effective in bringing about a Paretian improvement or a 
potential one may be overlooked. 
Coase (1960) claimed that simple institutional arrangements in which the 
environmental rights of individuals or entities are clearly specified can be used as 
an effective way to manage externalities. In such cases, negotiation between the 
affected parties is seen as a means to provide an ideal solution to the problem. Little 
or no involvement by the government or public administration is envisaged in such 
cases. The role of public bodies is limited to defining rights and providing legal 
remedies for the enforcement of agreements. However, Coase’s model is too 
simplistic. For example, it ignores the importance of transaction costs [this is 
surprising given that Coase (1937) is regarded as the founding father of transaction 
costs economics], does not take account of the endowment effect, and concentrates 
on the issue of economic efficiency ignoring questions of justice. When such factors 
are taken into account, the Coasian policy proposal may not be effective. In some 
cases, interventionist solutions are more efficient. 
Political acceptability plays an important role in determining what agricultural 
policies can be implemented. In any jurisdiction, political acceptability depends on 
its existing institutions and its historical background. While economic policy-
making needs to be related to what is politically acceptable, it can be argued that 
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agricultural economists should not be guided only by political acceptability in their 
policy formulation. They also have a responsibility to point out economic benefits 
that may be forgone when politically less popular policies are rejected. Otherwise, 
economists would merely become the passive supporters of politicians. 
The granting of property rights to entities developing new genetic material, such as 
new plant varieties and genetically modified organisms, has become of growing 
importance in recent decades. In agriculture, a major concern has been that this new 
genetic material might give rise to unknown or unanticipated negative externalities. 
There is considerable debate about how one can best balance the potential economic 
benefits from such genetic developments against the environmental risks and 
uncertainties they entail and about the institutional structures that might be best to 
address these problems. Different countries have developed different structures 
presumably influenced by their varying political backgrounds and evolutionary 
aspects of governance. Although an economic case exists for granting property 
rights to entities that develop new genetic agricultural material, there is a need to be 
more cautious about granting such rights in all extant natural genetic material to the 
region where that material has originated from. The economic argument for such 
property rights appears to be weak except in cases where these rights would result 
in the conservation of wanted genetic material that otherwise would not be 
conserved. The Convention on Biological Diversity assumes that by granting of 
such property rights in genetic materials originating locally to indigenous people, 
traditional farmers and similar entities, this will be effective for ensuring 
biodiversity conservation (thereby supporting sustainable development) and will 
also result in an equitable outcome. However, the transaction costs involved in 
implementing such a policy would be huge and could more than outweigh any 
economic benefit. While there could be some circumstances in which this property 
rights policy gives the desired results, success may be restricted to special cases. 
No single institutional arrangement such as the widened extension of private 
property rights is likely to be effective in addressing all economic externality and 
sustainability problems. A variety of institutional arrangements seem to be needed. 
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These will vary with the nature of the economic problem (such as with the 
exclusion costs, information costs involved) and with the political acceptability of 
the proposed measures. Furthermore, we know that public intervention is also 
subject to a variety of shortcomings as a means for dealing with externalities and 
lack of sustainability. Thus a critical attitude is required in assessing all alternative 
institutional arrangements. The most one can hope for is to choose the best one or 
ones from the set of attainable alternative institutional arrangements, none of which 
is likely to be perfect. The best attainable institutional arrangements are likely to 
vary from society to society and alter with the passage of time. The latter may occur 
because social values change, political systems evolve and transaction costs may 
decline with advances in technology. There are multiple factors and perspectives to 
be taken into account. Furthermore, not only do we not live in the best of all 
possible worlds unlike that imagined by Voltaire’s Pangloss (Voltaire, 1947), but in 
all probability, we never will. Nevertheless, by relying on rationalism we can avoid 
some of the less attractive policy prescriptions. Thus, rationalism should still play 
an important role in determining agricultural policy. At the same time, we must not 
expect rationalism to identify policies that will create a social Utopia because such a 
possibility is unachievable, in my view. 
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